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BOOK REVIEWS
RELIGION, MORALITY, AND LAW (Volume III, Southern Methodist University Studies in
Jurisprudence), edited by Arthur L. Harding. Southern Methodist University Press,
Dallas, Texas, 1956. Pp. x, 109. $3.00.*
Reviewed by
JOHN T. RICHARDSON, C.M.t
Less and less is the stigma of antiquar-
ianism being attached to studies and scholars
who in increasing numbers are turning their
attention to the philosophical and religious
background of law. Religion, Morality, and
Law represents the third in a series of studies
emerging from the annual Conference on
Law in Society, edited by Arthur L. Hard-
ing, Professor of Law at Southern Methodist
University. The scholarly jurists whose views
are presented in these volumes have taken a
scientific and modern approach to many
fundamental problems in jurisprudence,
thereby filling a growing demand caused by
the long-standing disregard American law
schools and law journals have had of re-
search in this area of jurisprudence. The
present volume differs from its predecessors
in the series in that religion and morality,
rather than the natural law, are viewed as
the basis of law.
This difference of emphasis is particularly
patent in the first essay, "Can There Be
Morality without Religion," in which Robert
E. Fitch disassociates natural law ethics
from either morality or religion, though
natural law has been found deeply bedded
in the finest moral and religious traditions
of the West since the days of St. Paul. In the
brief scope of his paper the author concen-
trates on the empirical aspects of his hy-
potheses that there can be no morality with-
out religion, tracing through history the
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tDean of the Graduate School, De Paul Uni-
versity.
failures of eighteenth century Enlighten-
ment, English Utilitarianism, and secular-
ized Protestantism. His arguments are clear
and incontestable. The case he presents
against humanism is not so concisely formu-
lated. Instead of demonstrating the inade-
quacy of humanism as a sole basis of moral-
ity, the author pictures it as opposed to
religion, and consequently disregards the
great contributions Christian humanism has
made to a reasonable and realistic morality
through its philosophy, its art, and its sci-
ence, the best of which have generally been
accepted as an integral part of our culture.
For a brief exposition of the Aristotelian-
Thomistic theory of universal order, reason,
and permanent values as the foundation of
both law and morality, Arthur Harding's
essay "Law Without Morality" is highly
commendable. The treatment is broad
enough to indicate the point of departure
and insufficiency of other theories that have
influenced modern legal concepts: the vari-
ous forms of determinism which have under-
mined the psychology of human choice in
law and morality; the absolutist's jurispru-
dence of John Austin which, reminiscent of
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, ulti-
mately identifies law with the will or aggre-
gate commands of the sovereign; the pure
theory of law devised by Hans Kelsen, which
logically seeks a more inclusive norm of law
but is left wavering without a solid basis.
The ethical "right," essential to both law
and morality as a starting point, is equally
important as a norm and guide of legal de-
velopment. Without moral values law floun-
ders in its legislative formation, its effec-
tive sanctions, and its administration. The
dual role of law as the operation of the
eternal law in human society and as the
governance of the people by the people does
not present a dilemma for the author. It is
the only rational explanation of the source
and function of law and morality.
A problem much closer to the legal prac-
titioner is discussed in Wilber G. Katz's
paper, "Christian Morality and Criminal
Law." The point at issue is immediately
narrowed down to the purpose of legal pun-
ishment according to classical Protestant
tradition, originally expressed in the writ-
ings of Luther and Calvin. Retribution, or
the exercise of justice, for a criminal act
freely chosen, is discounted as a basis for
punishment in as much as the author attrib-
utes to "realistic" Judeo-Christian tradition,
supported by dynamic psychology, an in-
sight into human nature which recognizes
the relatively fixed character of youth that
renders personal responsibility inappropri-
ate to the issue. To the extent that criminal
behavior is conditioned, responsibility is im-
posed upon the criminal with no fault of his
own, only the vicarious responsibility of
those determining his conduct. Rehabilita-
tion emerges as the prime purpose of pun-
ishment, with the prevention of crime as a
necessary result. An indirect appeal is made
to the reader for support of, or at least sym-
pathy with, a penal reform that will embody
the theories here expounded. Many will be
slow to answer the appeal, particularly those
who are less deterministic in their ideas of
human behavior and are more appalled at
the facility of delinquents and criminals to
blame others for their conduct. The evidence
presented from Protestant tradition is far
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from convincing; a stronger case can be
made for the author's theories on the basis
of behavioristic psychology.
Natural law has never found a secure
position within the framework of Protestant
theology. By theologians such as Karl Barth
it is rejected when the Christian is forced to
make the inevitable choice between Jesus
Christ and natural law. Ernst Troeltsch at-
tributes to it an importance equal to the
doctrine of the Trinity. In his paper entitled
"Theological Analysis of Natural Law,"
Joseph D. Quillian, Jr., formulates a theory
of Christian Natural Law that is essentially
different from the pagan concepts intro-
duced by Aristotle and the Stoic philoso-
phers. This natural law is "completely con-
verted." Since human reason is incapable
of knowing the essential nature of natural
law, basic natural precepts are matters of
faith rather than reason, part of divine reve-
lation. This theory of natural law is in com-
plete harmony with the author's concept of
the doctrine of grace, pointing, as it does,
to the benevolent sovereignty of God and
the responsibility of man. Natural law has,
however, lost its philosophical foundation;
it is no longer shared by all men; it is ulti-
mately a religious law in the supernatural
order of grace.
Regardless of the lawyer's personal posi-
tion in matters philosophical and religious,
he must eventually recognize the extent the
present status of law has been shaped by
the philosophy and religion of Western so-
ciety. It is very likely that law will continue
to be influenced by these same factors. Ob-
jective studies along these lines, particularly
if they are as thought-provoking as the ones
reviewed here, contribute greatly, therefore,
to the legal science of this country.
